We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. To remedy this, we introduce higher-order interactions, where a link can connect more than two individuals, and study their evolutionary dynamics. We first consider a public goods game on a uniform hypergraph, showing that it corresponds to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit, and providing an exact theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups. We also extend the analysis to heterogeneous hypergraphs that describe interactions of groups of different sizes and characterize the evolution of cooperation in such cases. Finally, we apply our new formulation to study the nature of group dynamics in real systems, showing how to extract the actual dependence of the synergy factor on the size of a group from data on large communities of international collaborations. Our work is a first step towards the implementation of new actions to boost cooperation in social groups. * Electronic address: unaialvarezr@gmail.com Cooperation in large groups of unrelated individuals distinguishes humans most from other mammals, and it is one of the central pillars of our evolutionary success [1]. The impetus for this remarkable other-regarding abilities can be attributed to the difficulties in rearing offspring that survived, which the genus Homo experienced from the onset of its existence [2]. Nature's pressure towards alloparenting care is thus one of the earliest, if not the earliest, example of human cooperation. And since such cooperation obviously requires communication and agreements, an argument can also be made that it is precisely because of it that we have evolved to the highest levels of intelligence in the animal world. In fact, an artificial neural network model was recently
manner, one would also need to consider all the groups in which the central player is member but is not central. Evidently, classical networks do not provide a unique procedure for defining a group. Moreover, members of the same group are commonly not all directly connected with one another, which prevents strategy changes among them, either in terms of imitation, replication, or exploration. These facts posit a lack of common theoretical foundation for studying the evolution of cooperation in networked groups. Without knowing who is connected to whom in a group, it is also impossible to implement fundamental mechanisms that promote cooperation, such as reciprocity [35, 36] , image scoring [37] [38] [39] , and reputation [40] [41] [42] .
As a solution, we here introduce and study higher-order interactions in evolutionary games that are played in groups. The distinctive feature of higher-order interactions is that, unlike in classical networks [43] , a link can connect more than just two individuals [44] . Thus, higherorder networks naturally account for structured group interactions, wherein a group is simply made up of all players that are connected by a so called hyperlink, which is the higher-order analogous of the link. As a paradigmatic example, we consider a standard public goods game on the higher-order analogous of a network, referred to as a hypergraph, see Figure 1 . We first show that it corresponds exactly to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit. As such, it thus provides an exact theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups -effectively a null model -that is amenable to further upgrades. Next, we consider the public goods game on heterogenous hypergraphs, which allow us to consider scenarios in which the synergy factor depends on the group size in a systematic and consistent manner. We show, for example, how synergy factors that are given by different powers of the group size lead to a critical scaling in the transition from defection to cooperation. Lastly, we also demonstrate how the proposed higherorder interaction framework can be used to determine the synergy factor as a function of the group size from experimental data, under the assumption that the structure of the hypergraph is the outcome of an optimization process of the game it hosts. For that, we use the Internet Engineering Task Force data (IETF), which is a large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution and the smooth operation of the Internet.
The public goods game describes a setting where N players are requested to contribute to a common pool with a token of value c [9] . Cooperators do contribute, and defectors do not. The collected amount is then multiplied by the so called synergy factor R, and the benefit is shared amongst all the members of the group. The payoff for the defectors and cooperators playing in a group of g members is given by π D = Rcw C /g and π C = Rcw C /g − c respectively, with w C representing the number of cooperators in the group. Typically c has a fixed value of c = 1, so that the behavior of the system is determined by the synergy factor R, or the reduced synergy factor r = R/g. Besides, it is common to represent the state of the system by the fraction of players adopting each strategy, x C for the cooperators and x D for the defectors.
The evolutionary dynamics determines how the strategies of the players evolve with each iteration of the PGG, that is, how the fractions x C and x D change with time. Here, we implement the so-called fixed cost per game approach, where cooperators contribute with an entire token to each game they play. Individual updates constitute micro-steps of the dynamics, whereas a (global) time step corresponds to N individual steps, so that all the players in the system have the chance to play the game and update their strategies. Players interact among them following the links of the network they are embedded in. As mentioned before, the standard network implementation [33] , henceforth referred to as graph implementation (GI), is not able to account for the most general interaction in groups [45] [46] [47] (see the Appendix for a detailed explanation).
In order to account for higher-order interactions, we use hypergraphs [44] . A hypergraph, H(N , L), is a mathematical object that consists of a set of N nodes N = {n 1 = 1, .., n N = N } and a set of L hyperlinks L = {l 1 , ..., l L }. Each hyperlink is a subset of two or more elements of N and represents a group interaction. For instance, in Figure 1a , the hyperlink l 1 contains nodes n 1 and n 3 , whereas the hyperlink l 3 is the subset made up by nodes n 4 , n 5 and n 6 . Furthermore, the cardinality of a subset, known as the order of the hyperlink, is the number g of nodes in the group.
In the previous example, l 1 has order 2 and l 3 has order 3. In a hypergraph, the hyperdegree, k i , of a node i represents the number of hyperlinks in which the node is involved into, thus, the number of groups of a specific order g that contains i can be denoted by k g i . Hence, the hyperdegree of i is given as k i = g + g=g − k g i , where g − and g + account for the minimal and maximal orders in L. For example, in Figure 1a , k 4 = 3 = k 2 4 + k 3 4 , with k 2 4 = 1 (the hyperlink l 4 ) and k 3 4 = 2 (the hyperlinks l 2 and l 3 ).
Although hypergraphs are not the only possible representation of group interactions, they allow to exploit the analogy between the links representing pairwise interactions in contact networks and hyperlinks, which are based on higher-order, group interactions. As we will show next, the differences between these two approaches lead to fundamentally distinct outcomes of the PGG evolutionary dynamics. To see how the evolutionary dynamics evolves in hypergraphs, let us consider the first step of a standard graph implementation of the PGG. When a node n i and one of its neighbors n j are selected on a graph, it is equivalent to say that a node and one of its links are selected. Such a procedure can be easily generalized to group interactions of more than g = 2 individuals, see Figure 1b . Note that if we choose more neighbors of n i to generate higherorder interactions, such an extension would still be based on dyadic ones. Instead, we propose a hypergraph implementation (HI) of the game that consists of selecting one of the hyperlinks of n i .
That is, in the HI setup, we select at random with uniform probability a node n i in the hypergraph and one of its hyperlinks, l i . Then, all the members of the hyperlink l i play a game for each of the hyperlinks they are part of, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Finally, as it is customary, the nodes accumulate the payoffs of all the rounds they play, and we normalize this quantity by the total number of played games, such that each node's performance is represented by its average payoff.
The second part of each micro-step of the evolutionary dynamics of the game involves updating the strategy of node n i . To this end, we generalize the discrete replicator dynamics for the case of higher-order interactions. We propose to compare the payoff π i of a node n i with the maximal payoff of the selected hyperlink l i . Under this rule, n i will adopt the strategy of the node with the maximal payoff with probability 1 ∆ j∈l i (π j − π i ) k∈l i θ(π j − π k ), where ∆ accounts for the maximal payoff difference. Note that the previous expression reduces to the standard one of the GI when g = 2.
Results
To get some insights into the dynamics of the system in a simple configuration, we first studied the PGG on uniform random hypergraphs (URH) with hyperlinks of order equal to g =2, 3, 4 and In the HI implementation, a node, n 2 , and one of its hyperlinks, l 2 , are randomly selected. All the nodes in the hyperlink l 2 , namely node n 2 , and the two nodes highlighted in red n 3 and n 4 , play all the games they are involved into, corresponding, in this example, to PGG defined for the subset of nodes of the hyperlinks l 1 , l 2 , l 3 and l 4 . Then, the strategy of n 2 is updated by comparing its payoff with that of the node with the highest accumulated payoff of the hyperlink l 2 . This is not equivalent to play the PGG in the graph generated by projecting the interactions of the hypergraph, which is shown in panel (b). In the standard GI implementation, a neighbor of n 2 , let us say n 3 −highlighted in red− is randomly selected. The two nodes n 2 and n 3 then play all the games of the groups they are part of, that is, of the groups made up by the subsets of nodes {n 1 , n 3 }, {n 2 , n 3 , n 4 }, {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 } and {n 2 , n 3 , n 4 , n 5 , n 6 , n 7 }. These subsets, colored as indicated in the figure, could be represented by a different set of hyperlinksl 1 ,l 2 ,l 3 andl 4 , respectively, which are different from the set of hyperlinks of the original hypergraph. Finally, the strategy of n 2 is updated by comparing its accumulated payoff to that of node n 3 .
with L = L c hyperlinks, where L c accounts for the minimal number of hyperlinks that guarantees the connectedness of the hypergraph. As it can be seen in the figure, there is a value of r beyond which cooperation emerges. We define this critical value of the reduced synergy factor, r c , which depends on g, as the lowest value of r for which the fraction of cooperators is nonzero.
The results show that r c decreases when the order g of the hyperlinks of the hypergraph increases. This is equivalent to say that r c decreases when the same number of N = 1000 individ- uals play in larger groups. We believe that this observation is important, since determining how r varies with the size of the group, allows to get more realistic insights. Admittedly, the well-mixed limit of population-size groups is rarely applicable in reality, thus, the study of the impact of having large groups inside large populations, as allowed by our higher-order framework, is key. The panel (b) of Fig. 2 displays how the value of r c depends on the number of hyperlinks L in the hypergraphs. For each value of g, we observe an increase of r c with L, and a tendency, for large hypergraph densities, to the value r c = 1, which corresponds to the well-mixed replicator approximation [48] . Finally, the value of r also influences how long it takes for the system to converge to the stationary solution. This is illustrated in panel (c), where we show results of the relaxation time from an initial configuration with x D = x C = 0.5, in a hypergraph with L = 5L c . These results are obtained by running the simulations up to a maximum of 10 4 steps. Furthermore, for the replicator approximation, the value of T can be analytically computed as T = ln(N −1) |Q| , with Q = (1 − r)/∆ (see the Appendix for the details of the calculation). As it can be seen in the figure, the agreement between the theoretical predictions and the numerical results is qualitatively and quantitatively very good. This indicates that the dynamics of the PGG on uniform random hypergraphs corresponds to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit.
The proposed HI of the PGG allows to study the more general, realistic and interesting case of hypergraphs where not all the hyperlinks have the same order. Important examples of such systems include teams of different sizes working for a common goal or one-to-many communication via apps like WhatsApp, where users can create and belong to several groups of different sizes. In what follows, we consider heterogenous random hypergraphs with an assigned distribution of hyperlinks. Such hypergraphs are characterized by their total number of hyperlinks L and by a probability vector p = {p g } g + g=g − , whose entry p g = k g /k specifies how likely it is, on average, that the hyperdegree k of the node contains k g groups of order g. p is normalized such that
Considering groups of different orders in the same hypergraph allows to focus on another important aspect of the PGG on higher-order structures, namely, the possible dependence of the rescaled synergy factor r on the order of the group. This is important for practical purposes, given the increasing interest in understanding how the size of a group impacts its performance.
As it has been shown recently [49] , large and small teams play different roles in science and technology ecosystems, thus, it is natural to assume that the synergy factor of a group depends on its size. This is particularly true in scientific publications, where it has been shown that the larger the group, the more citations a produced publication is likely to attract [50, 51] . Therefore, as a general form for such a dependence we assume that the synergy factor R is an increasing power law function of g, namely:
with parameter α > 0 and exponent β ≥ 0. The value of the exponent allows to tune the benefit that the players are able to produce when working as a group. In particular, adopting a superlinear scaling β > 1, means considering a synergistic effect of a group that goes beyond the sum of the individual contributions [52, 53] . Furthermore, the assumed dependence in Eq. (1) completely neglects saturation effects or even possible disadvantages due to difficulties in coordinating large groups. Under this assumption, the average payoff difference between cooperation and defection can be written as:
where g − and g + are again the minimal and maximal orders of hyperlinks, respectively. The relaxation time is again given by T = ln(N − 1)/|Q|, where Q = (π D −π C )/∆ (see the Appendix for the definition of ∆ in the general case and for explicit calculations). It is then possible to derive the critical value of the parameter α as a function of the exponent β as:
where, for simplicity, we have defined K β ≡ g + g=g − p g g β−1 . To explore how the dynamics evolves in heterogeneous random hypergraphs, we have per- to their value of K β , i.e., the value of the critical point α c (β). As for the case of uniform random hypergraphs, we find that although the critical point is slightly over estimated for low densities by the analytical approximation, there is still a good agreement between the theoretical predictions of the well-mixed replicator approximation and the numerical simulations. We next explore the behavior of the relaxation time. Panels e) through h) shows results obtained for heterogenous hypergraphs with k = 5k c . As it was done for the homogeneous scenario, we follow the dynamics of the system up to a maximum of T = 10 4 time steps. The plots show that the relaxation times depend on α for all values of β = 1, albeit rather differently with respect to the dependence of the critical value α c for β < 1 and β > 1. In order to further explore this relationship, we analyzed how the average relaxation time varies as a function of the critical point α c . Results shown in panels i) to l) reveal that the dependence is always linear. However, when the synergy factor increases super linearly, there appear different curves, each one corresponding to a distinct family of hypergraphs and characterized by a different linear relation between the average relaxation time and the critical value. This behavior introduces an additional degree of freedom that can turn very useful, since the degeneracy that is observed for β ≤ 1 is broken for β > 1, and therefore one can independently set a critical point and a relaxation time by opportunely choosing the corresponding hypergraph.
From the previous results, a natural question arises: is it possible to determine the value of the synergy factor for a real PGG for each of the possible group sizes? A plausible answer to this question can be obtained under the assumption that the very same structure of the hypergraph is the result of an evolutionary process in which nodes select the groups they belong to. We hypothesize that each individual tries to optimize the ideal number of groups of each order, based on the perceived dependence of the synergy factor on the group size. In this way, each real-world hypergraph would be the optimal structure that supports the game it hosts. We could then extract the functional form R(g) directly from the hyperdegree distribution of the hypergraph. More precisely, the goal would be to use the information in the vector p of the hypergraphs on which the PGG occurs to determine the functional form, R(g), of the synergy factor by imposing two conditions. The first condition comes from the assumption that the unknown reduced synergy factor r(g) is proportional to p g . This originates in the intuition that the distribution of the hyperdegree of a generic player should be aligned with the potential benefit that each player expects to obtain for each higher-order interaction. The second condition imposes that the average payoff of cooperators is equal to the average payoff of defectors. This implies that the system is at equilibrium and guarantees the coexistence of cooperators and defectors. Thus, given that these two conditions are satisfied, it is possible to extract the curves of r(g) and R(g) for each higher-order structure in real datasets.
In order to show that the aforementioned procedure applies to real scenarios, we use the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) dataset. The dataset contains the information about the number of authors in each publication written by the IETF members. Fig. 4 reports the profile of the synergy factors R(g) and r(g) obtained for this dataset. For both the total and the reduced synergy factors, we immediately notice the existence of a maximum value of R and r, respectively. This indicates that there is an optimal tradeoff between the positive and negative effects of increasing the group size. In the case of r, the maximum is located at g = 2, and accounts for the group size with the maximal individual payoff. For R, the maximum is located at g = 5, and represents the group size with the largest total synergy factor.
It is possible to extract more information from the observed features of this dataset by factorizing the synergy factor as the product of two (opposite) functions of g and then perform a numerical fit, see Methods. This enables us to interpret the synergy factor as a combination of two contrary effects of the higher-order interactions for this particular dataset. The results provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the IETF publication dataset. Specifically, in the context of this bibliographic dataset, hidden benefits and costs that conform the synergy factor can be associated to several aspects of the task of producing a publication. Benefits (increase of the synergy factor with increasing g) would correspond to the potential reinforcement of the amount and quality of the ideas and the potential increase in the outreach of the work with the number of co-authors involved. On the contrary, the costs (decrease with increasing g) would be the additional organizational effort in the process of arriving to a consensus and carrying out the tasks for publishing a paper. These ideas are aligned with recent studies about the creation and production of research ideas [54] and the role, group dynamics and success of teams [49] [50] [51] . Our formalism allows for a quantitative analysis of these phenomena and could be used in future applications to design ways to foster higher-order cooperation.
Discussion
Summing up, we have introduced higher-order interactions in evolutionary games to study cooperation in groups. Since higher-order interactions allow for a single link to connect more than just two individuals, they are naturally suitable to define groups in networks. In doing so, higherorder interactions thus do away with the arbitrary definitions of groups in classical networks, and they provide an exact theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups. We have shown that the public goods game on a hypergraph is effectively a null model that agrees exactly with the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit. As such, it can be used in future research towards upgrades that add additional layers of reality in models of human cooperation, either by means of strategic complexity [9] , or by means of more complex interaction networks [55] .
Towards the latter effect, we have also studied the public goods game on heterogeneous hypergraphs, where hyperlinks can have different lengths. Due to the exact definition of a group in the proposed framework, we have been able to systematically and consistently consider synergy factors that are dependent on group size. Indeed, the framework allows us to understand group size effects on cooperation in its most general form. As an example, we have considered synergy factors that are given by different powers of the group size, showing a critical scaling in the transition from defection to cooperation. In this case too, we have observed a significant agreement between the simulations and the analytical predictions of the model. Our framework enables novel analyses of real systems, as we have shown for the IETF publications dataset, providing new insights regarding the positive and negative effects associated to higher-order interactions and the nature of group dynamics.
It is also worth mentioning that in his essay titled Innate Social Aptitudes of Man, W. D. Hamilton wrote, "There may be reasons to be glad that human life is a many-person game and not just a disjoined collection of two-person games". He was referring to the fact that social enforcement works better in groups with more than two members, which can offer at least a partial cure for the problems with reciprocation in larger groups. Indeed, humans have a special gift for reciprocation, but even defining it in large groups is a non-trivial task [36] . If the group contains a cooperator and a defector, and in the absence of information who is who, whom do you reciprocate with? We note that the theoretical framework of higher-order interactions resolves this long-standing challenge in evolutionary game theory, and in the future invites reexamining fundamental mechanisms that may promote cooperation, such as image scoring [37] [38] [39] , rewarding [56] , and punishment
Given the fundamental differences between pairwise and higher-order interactions, it would also be of interest to revisit the role of specific network properties and their role in the evolution of cooperation. In this regard, the role of strongly heterogenous degree distributions [15] [16] [17] , community structure [19] , as well as two or more network layers [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] , promise to be fruitful ground for future explorations on how interaction structure impacts cooperation. Overall, we believe that the introduction of higher-order interactions to evolutionary games has a strong transformative potential for better understanding the evolution of cooperation and other social processes in networks, and we hope that our research will prove to be an important first step in this exciting and promising direction.
Methods
Uniform random hypergraphs (URH): As a prerequisite for working out the numerical simulations we explain here the procedure for creating hypergraphs where all the hyperlinks have the same order, which are known as uniform hypergraphs. An URH of order g is constructed by assigning a uniform probability p to each g-tuple of N . For each of them, a random number in the [0, 1) interval is generated, and if this number is lower than p, the hyperlink containing the g-tuple is created. However, this method scales badly with g given the large amount of g-tuples to be considered. A more efficient variant is to have a predefined value of hyperlinks L, and generate a random integer in the [1, C N g ] interval. One has to provide an ordering for the set of all possible hyperlinks, so that each of the random integers corresponds to a position in this ordering.
The hyperlinks that are reached through this process are created. For the purpose of studying the stationary condition of a game, we are interested in having a connected hypergraph. The critical thresholds for hyperlinks L c and hyperdegree k c are given by L c = N ln N/g and k c = ln N .
When p is tuned to exceed these numbers there is a high probability that the resultant hypergraph is connected.
Induced synergy factor from higher-order structures: We explain the procedure for deriving the synergy factor of real games given the information of the hypergraph. Let us take a closer look at the assumptions allowing for this procedure. The first one, which is only needed if one does not have direct access to the degree distribution, is to derive the degree distribution by assuming that the dataset can be modelled as a heterogeneous random hypergraph. In this case, we transform the distribution in the total number of articles to the distribution in the number of articles a given node is part of, by assuming k g = gL g /N . The second one, the critical point condition, π D = π C seems a natural requirement for a stationary system once we neglect the trivial x D = 1 and x C = 1 solutions. In the simulations we test different expressions, and numerically find those parameters that minimize the distance with either R(g) or r(g). The best results that we have obtained, labelled as e i in Fig. 4 , are given by e 1 : r(g) = γ 0 g γ 1 e −γ 2 (g−1) e 2 : R(g) = γ 0 g γ 1 e −γ 2 (g−1) e 3 : r(g) = γ 0 g γ 1 e −γ 2 (g−1) γ 3 e 4 : R(g) = γ 0 g γ 1 e −γ 2 (g−1) γ 3
Notice that here the (e 1 ,e 2 ) and (e 3 ,e 4 ) pairs of equations have the same structure, but their parameters have been obtained by minimizing the distance with r(g) and R(g), respectively. The γ 0 parameter is obtained analytically by applying the critical point condition.
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FIG. 4: Induced synergy factor from higher-order structures. We extract the synergy factor as a function of the group size for a bibliographic dataset of the IETF that contains the number of publications as a function of the number of authors g. We first infer the distribution in the hyperdegrees from the original dataset by assuming that the hypergraph is random. We then impose the critical point condition and extract the value of the synergy factor under the hypothesis that r(g) is proportional to p. Finally, the synergy factors r(g) in (a) and R(g) in (b) are factorized in two analytical expressions that are respectively an increasing and a decreasing function of g. These functions represent the positive and negative effects of the groups and are assumed to be encoded in the synergy factor. The positive contribution scales superlinearly with the number of players and the negative one decreases exponentially. See Methods for the explicit form of the expressions for e i . in π C . The payoff is calculated with the reduced synergy factor r.
The total average payoffs, are obtained by multiplying the ones of Eq. (4) with the average degree.
But, we also normalize the total payoff with the degree, so the terms that go into the dynamical equation are indeed π D and π C . One can observe that the π D −π C function is invariant with respect to the order g.
We now compute ∆, the maximal payoff difference to be used in the replicators update rule.
The π + and π − indicate the maximal and minimal payoff values from all the possible configuration of strategies.
∆ is only expressed for comparisons of payoffs of different strategies, since the strategies are copied from the neighbours, and therefore the terms π + i − π − i , where two nodes share the same strategy, are irrelevant. For any order g, ∆ is given by
We now work with Q, the normalized payoff difference, Q ≡ (π D − π C )/∆.
The system equation is derived as the sum of all the channels via which the strategy of a node can change. These channels correspond to the different configurations of strategies of hyperlinks of order g, weighted with the probabilities of the nodes having a particular strategy. For each configuration, one has to compute the probability of having a defector-cooperator pair, w D w C /g(g−1) and the probability that this pair results in an strategy change. Notice that the values of w D and w C , the number of defectors and cooperators in the group, are precisely the exponents of x C and x D .
We employ the replicator update, which in this context means that the flip probability is computed as −Qθ(π C − π D ) when a defector changes into a cooperator and as Qθ(π D − π C ) in the opposite case. This sign corresponds to the calculation of the fraction of defectors, the contrary holds true for the fraction of cooperators.
This is precisely the replicator equation which provides a very useful tool for describing the system since its structure does not explicitly depend on g, even if the evolution itself does, since Q is a function of g.
The stationary condition yields three possible outcomes, x D = 0, x C = 0 and Q = 0. The first two are the trivial phases of the system, and the third one denotes the critical point, that corresponds to r = 1. Notice that this condition is reduced to finding the zeros of Eq. (5), and is therefore common for all systems, and independent of their order. This implies that for random uniform hypergraphs cooperators only emerge when R > g.
If the initial condition is given by a uniform distribution of strategies, x D = x C = 0.5, the time evolution reads
x D (t) = 1 1 + e Qt x C (t) = 1 1 + e −Qt (11) Even if the relaxation time is infinite, we can get the time to arrive the neighbourhood of the asymptotic state by imposing the condition x i = 1/N or x i = (N − 1)/N that yield T = ln(N − 1) |Q| (12)
C. Replicator Dynamics for HRH
The first thing to notice is that the average payoff difference, is nothing but the sum of the average payoff differences for each of the orders, weighted with the p g . The sum goes from g − , the minimal value of g to g + , the maximal one.
We first derive the normalization factor ∆, from Eq. (7), via the explicit expression for the reduced synergy factor r g = αg β−1 . We consider α, β ≥ 0. The extreme point of r g at β = 1 divides the analysis in two different intervals, β < 1 and β ≥ 1.
In the first one, β < 1, the maximal payoffs π + are obtained for the lowest order g − , and the minimal payoffs π − for the highest order g + .
π + D = αg β−1 − (g − − 1), π − D = 0, π + C = αg β − − 1, π − C = αg β−1
Therefore, we get
In the second interval, β ≥ 1, the maximal payoffs are obtained for the maximal orders, and the minimal payoffs for the minimal orders. π + D = αg β−1 + (g + − 1), π − D = 0, π + C = αg β + − 1, π − C = αg β−1 − − 1
which yields,
With π D −π C and ∆, we can obtain Q, as in the uniform case. And in terms of Q the differential equation for the time evolution is exactly Eq. (10). Therefore, the relaxation time is again given by Eq. (12) , and the critical point is again obtained by making π D − π C = 0, which yields
